

Ex # 1879

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Each page of the attached annexure comprising in all 15 pages was imprinted by OSAKI Toshihiko with his right thumb in my presence at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, and the contents were sworn to be true before me this eighth day of August one thousand nine hundred and forty-six.

/s/ H. A. Williams, Major

Investigating Officer

2 Aust War Crimes Sec

Statement Concerning the British POW's on BALLALE Island
by Norihiko OZAWA, former Chief of the 18th Naval Construction
Battalion stationed on the Island. /Fingerprint/

(1) Foreword

As I am about to state my past life on BALLALE Island which was led under pressure and uncertainty by merely relying upon my memory, there may be some inaccuracies as regards the dates, time and figures, but same will probably become clarified by your referring to the corresponding Army or Navy records dealing with that time which are probably in your hands, which please note.

(2) Outline of Developments

(a) After my Battalion had failed twice in advancing to Guadalcanal Island, we immediately (on about 26 or 27 November 1942) left Buin on Bougainville Island, where we were standing by for Ballale Island, on receipt of orders to promptly construct an airfield on the said island.

(b) At that time this island was uninhabited. Although small, a preliminary survey and preparations had been made in outline on the island beforehand in order to reinforce the Buin airfield. My battalion consisted of some 120 petty officers and men as well as about 800 construction workmen and its working efficiency was extremely low.

The order from the 11th Air Fleet to which our battalion belonged stated: "Work under the direction of the Commander of the 26th Air Squadron, finish the construction of an airfield in outline in 45 days (?); the laborers will be reinforced by some 4,000 (?) men.

However, although we waited impatiently, the reinforcement of 4,000 men never arrived, and although workmen despatched by the 4th Construction and Service Department on Truk Island arrived temporarily, they were made to move up to Munda again after only about 2 days' stay (the majority of them being invalids, it was only natural that not much working power could be expected of the men of this unit.

In the circumstances, our battalion proceeded to ask for the military forces on Bougainville Island to aid us in our work and to send paymasters, 2nd lieutenants (Med.) and other necessary /T.N. Battalion/ personnel to the nearby islands such as Bougainville, Shortland and Fauro so as to employ natives by propagation in various places and to make use of their working power.

(c) It was perhaps a few days after having proceeded to the island when one evening a fairly large transport cast anchor there suddenly and hundreds of persons who looked like POWs began to land on this island. Before long

the commanding officer, an Army 2nd Lieutenant (according to my memory) came to see me and remarked, "I have brought along 527 (?) Army POW's from Rabaul by order. You may use them in constructing the airfield at your place." However, due to not having received any instructions or orders from any of my command channels such as the Supreme Naval Headquarters or the 26th Air Squadron, at first I declined his proposal.

But the military officer said, "That would put me in an awful fix. As a matter of fact, I have been ordered to depart on another mission as soon as the landing of the POW's is over. As soon as I return to my post, I will have matters duly settled through my seniors. It is the Army's duty to look after all the supervision, directing and controlling of the POW's on the island. The 18 military guards whom I have brought here for that reason will be stationed with the POW's throughout the whole of the period until their duties are over. You had better make use only of their working power at this time of shortage of same, hadn't you?" I replied, "As for our battalion, it would be very good to make use of them for some suitable work, but it would be embarrassing for me too to bear troublesome responsibility as I have not been contacted at all in the matter by my seniors. The only thing is that I feel confident of bearing utmost responsibility only as regards feeding them, apart from which I cannot do anything. Would only that be sufficient?" "Yes. It would be O.K. at that." After the foregoing controversy, I made up my mind to "take care of them for the time being" until instructions should come from my naval immediate superiors. (After all I received neither any instructions nor orders whatsoever to the very last).

(d) By this time, a 12 cm. AA Company commanded by Naval 1st Lieutenant MIYAKE had already been stationed on this island besides our battalion. In addition to the foregoing, a 12 cm. AA Company commanded by Naval 1st Lieutenant KIMBARA, an 8 cm. AA Company commanded by 2nd Lieutenant TAKAHASHI and half a 13 mm. AA M.G. division (maybe one division) were scheduled to advance to this island and engage in guard duties in the near future, but none of them had arrived there at that time except the above-mentioned MIYAKE Company.

Moreover, a force of about 2 battalions strong was scheduled to proceed to the island mainly to assist us in constructing our airfield with the understanding of the military forces at EREBENTA /phonetic/ on Bougainville Island who were waiting for the arrival of equipment from Japan proper.

(e) It was in the aforesaid manner that over 500 POW's were forced upon me, and although I felt greatly obliged for the supply of a considerable amount of working power at a time of shortage thereof, I was placed at my wit's end as I had never for a moment expected such a thing, as well as had never received any orders or instructions as to how to treat them, especially as I had no experience.

Here I shall explain my predicament in full detail. I am originally an engineering officer graduated from the Naval Engineering College, and was

called up to duty from the First Reserve. In the Japanese Navy the Naval Command Observance Regulations /T.M. "Gunrei Shoko Rei/ have hitherto been strictly adhered to, and at places where the so-called Line Officers having graduated from the Naval Academy are stationed, engineering officers are not given the right of command for general military operations. The right given to me was limited to the construction of the airfield and I was authorized to merely command my construction battalion under the command of my immediate superiors. (The title of "Engineering" was abolished from November 15, 1942 and accordingly I, too, was promoted to Lieutenant Commander from Engineer Lieutenant.) Therefore, all military operations on the island excepting for the Construction work should be placed under the command of Naval Lieutenant Kimbara (in case of his death 1st Lieutenant Takahashi).

However, being a special duty officer specially promoted from the ranks, Lieutenant Miyaki had no right to command me.

(f) In the circumstances, as regards the question of responsibility in the handling of the POW's for the sake of enabling everything to run smoothly hereafter:

1. The military guards who accompanied the POW's from Rabaul will take charge of all the duties such as supervising and commanding.
2. The foregoing military guards shall be placed under the command of the commanding officer of the two battalions of military troops coming from Erebona /phonetic/.
3. Our battalion will assume responsibility as regards general maintenance such as food, medical supplies and housing.

That was because our battalion had--although none too much--some quantity of living necessities to spare, whereas the stocks of both the Naval and Military units were scanty (especially the Military unit had nothing at all).

As for this matter, it had been decided that our battalion would hold itself responsible for supplying the needs of not only the POW's, but also of the Military as well as native units.

4. After a few days, about two battalions of military troops arrived on the island as scheduled, and after a conference with the commander of the military forces, it was decided unanimously to put the above three items into effect.

5. The concrete details regarding the construction work were based on the general instructions received by me from the 26th Air Squadron Command (there was a period when I was temporarily under the command of the 204th Air Commander), on the basis of which our staff and the Military staff discussed the allotment of the details for the work, following which instructions were given to the guards by the Military Commander as to the duties

assigned to the POW's on the previous day or early in the morning of the said day. Thus the POW's performed their work under the direct supervision and direction of the guards.

I therefore believe that not even our staff officers meddled directly as regards the work of the POW's, and that everything was carried on smoothly under the hands of the Military authorities.

6. Some of the leading workers of our Battalion who were designated by me supervised and directed the work of the native unit, and accordingly apart from our own men, our battalion took direct charge of only the native unit (which I believe numbered about 500 (?) at the most).

7. The supervising and directing of the POW's outside of their working hours was supposed to be undertaken by the 15 POW guards under the command of the Military Commander (Captain Senda at the outset) but, to the best of my memory, I believe that some of them were, at one time, placed under the command of the Miyake Company in connection with the living quarters as well as due to it being more convenient to utilize the look-out station of the Miyake Company for the sake of their daily work as well as air defence operations.

8. After the lapse of several days the Kimbara and Takahashi companies arrived at the Island, and I was placed under the command of Naval Lieutenant Kimbara as a natural result of the Navy's practice in accordance with the provisions of the Naval Command Observance Regulations /T.N. "Gunrei Shoko-Rei"/. The POW's however were handled as mentioned above without any special changes being made.

(g) Conditions at the time of arrival of the POW's on the Island.

1. On watching the POW's as they were disembarking from the transport, although there were some who were extremely "peppy," the majority of them were so weak that they could not walk by themselves and were only barely able to do so with the help of their comrades. Having observed this scene, I could not help from feeling somewhat apprehensive as regards how much contribution could be expected of them towards the rapid construction of the airfield.

2. As there were about 10 (?) medical personnel including a Captain of the Medical Corps (?) as well as other medical men, a medical examination was held by them in conjunction with our battalion's Medical Officer and his subordinates, a result of which it was said that there were many diphtheria patients as well as patients suffering from asthenia caused by chronic enteritis (have forgotten the number of cases).

Before being called to the colours, our Battalion's Medical Officer had made a special study regarding Diphtheria and was so well experienced as to have his doctorate thesis on the said subject under consideration at the time, so that I received a report later on that, due to the great interest

shown, and strenuous efforts exerted by him, that the Diphtheria epidemic was stamped out without spreading so much.

It was so arranged that medical supplies and appliances were, whenever necessary, handed to the Medical Officer of the POW Unit en bloc (once a week?) whenever requests were received from him, and daily diagnoses and medical treatment were effected independently by the POW unit in view of the shortage of hands. Needless to say, of course, in case of emergency our medical officers went to their aid whenever necessary. Consequently, the daily authorization of absence from work owing to illness of all POWs was left entirely to the free discretion of the Chief Medical Officer of the POW unit.

However, a fairly large number of deaths occurred from sickness (as far as I remember, there were times when there were as many as about three deaths in a day) due to the sudden change in living conditions, increased degree of asthma or the usual aggravated form of diarrhoea due to drinking too much unboiled water.

3. As there were more than ten men connected with cooking including an Intendance Lieutenant, it was arranged that they would handle the cooking independently by speedily erecting a kitchen. It was also arranged that food-stuffs for a week were to be handed to them once a week all at once so that they could cook their own food in their own manner. I recollect that, as the supply officer told me that they specially preferred wheat flour and canned goods to rice, I tried as much as possible to meet their request and think that they were handed to them fairly plentifully. I was once invited to come over to inspect the place once as they had commenced baking bread with the use of oil-drums and coconut oil. Furthermore, tobacco was also supplied to them in accordance with a suggestion from the supply officer.

4. The general state of health of the POWs was, as mentioned above, and as their physical strength had declined considerably, the work they were engaged in throughout the entire period of the construction works consisted only of gathering pebbles from the reef along the shore facing the sea on the Eastern side of the Island (medium and small in size and used for filling in when levelling the runway and loading same into transport trucks). Besides, I remember that they were engaged a little in cleaning and clearing the airfield and neighboring taxi strips.

I remember also that I did not make them engage at all in labour with pickaxes and shovels, loading and unloading, as well as transportation of heavy goods, because of their weak knees and general declining strength. I think that, after all, the working efficiency throughout the entire period was rather poor in spite of their efforts.

Moreover, some of them volunteered to drive trucks, but this request was never granted as our battalion was amply provided with drivers.

5. Now, although the sharing of the respective responsibilities towards the POWs continued from start to finish as stated above, my battalion conformed to the form of Provisional Enlistment of all the POWs as regards the procedure for supply and accounts as we were providing them with all supplies.

This applies not only to the POWs but also to military units and even to naval personnel under a different jurisdiction. Our Navy makes it their customary practice to adopt such a procedure for supply and accounting reasons in order, for the sake of temporary convenience, to provide food and clothing to those who are not our regular battalion personnel and our battalion also merely followed this practice.

Accordingly, in view of the aforementioned circumstances, the POWs were considered as being a temporary enlisted unit and, in addition to our drawing up the POW muster-roll on the strength of the data submitted by them, any unforeseen occurrences like "Deaths from Sickness" or "Killed in Action" were recorded in my battalion's reports. The object thereof was to satisfy supply and accounting requirements, and I believe that the POW problem will become fully clarified by referring to the said reports.

6. As for the living quarters, being by all means a small island in the first place, there would be no alternative, after constructing a standard air base, than to utilize the remaining space left over. The maximum number of inhabitants on the island exceeded at one time the 6,000 mark so that I was much worried at one time over the selection of the living quarters regarding which the Air Force personnel enjoyed priority selecting rights, but finally this matter was settled by fixing same at a point northwest of the Miyake Company, west of the Military Unit, and southwest of the Takahashi Company, by taking into account the facts that the place was farthest from the airfield and at the same time adjacent to the location of the Military Unit under whose direct command they were. As for the dwelling facilities, inasmuch as the building materials stored by our battalion had been already fairly well used up and as the manner of use of all those on hand had already been decided, there was practically no surplus left over, but finally we succeeded in the speedy construction of a camp sufficient at least to shelter them from rain, by using the materials in store and those procured on the spot.

(h) Important Problems (No. 1)

Several days after the POWs were brought to the Island, approximately two battalions of Army troops which had been under request came from Eleventa /phonetic/ on Bougainville Island. The Commander at that time was Captain Senda.

Although there may have been incidental sins in the Army occupation, I believe that they strived to assist in the Navy's airfield work and receive all rations from the Navy in the meantime, and lighten the burden on the main force, instead of uselessly and aimlessly awaiting the arrival of armament.

As regards the actual problem of construction work, a definite talk between Captain Senda and myself was held and a division of work was established. It was the work which is to be carried out by the Army should be commanded by Captain Senda and that the Naval Construction Battalion should never directly interfere with any work of the Army. It is, moreover, a matter of course that no interference whatsoever should be made directly or indirectly in matters aside from Naval construction work. One day, several days after the occupation by the Army, there was an incident of mistaken firing upon the island by an Army force that was passing by. Directly after this, Captain Senda suggested that we should now make plans for the defense of the island and that studies and trainings were needed. However, since I am originally from the Navy Engineering Department and have some knowledge of engineering matters, but had neither knowledge, experience nor training in this matter /T. N. defense/, besides which I had no power of command. Therefore, I immediately requested Captain Senda to draw up the plans, and it was hurriedly decided in the names of Captain Senda and myself to adopt this plan temporarily until the arrival of Naval Commanding Officer who would direct me. However, several days later, the Kinbara Company came to the island, so I submitted to Lieutenant (S.G.) Kinbara /T.N. Navy/ the defense plans, and asked him to revise and establish same appropriately in the capacity of the Naval Commanding Officer.

In one part of this defense plan there was an item to the effect that prisoners will be disposed of in case the danger of an enemy landing becomes imminent. I remember that the method was by use of hand grenades and that it was up to one company of the Army forces (I do not remember the Company that was designated). A glance at the defense plan of the time in question will reveal this.

After Lieutenant Kinbara came to the island, the defense plan of Ballale Island was newly established and promulgated in the name of the Commanding Officer of the Navy Guard Unit. According to this plan, my Construction Battalion was to be a reserve unit, and was to withdraw to the opposite side from where the enemy makes an invasion, and await orders there. I do not remember other details, especially how matters such as

concerted action with the Army were decided. However, my sole duty was to exert my attention and efforts in regard to commanding and guiding my non-combatant subordinates in the form of approximately 800 workers as well as approximately 120 petty officers and men so as to minimize the casualties among these men as far as possible.

I believe it was in the early part of January 1943 that Naval Captain MIKI came to the island as the Supreme Commander, for the purpose of commanding the combined Army - Navy forces on Ballale Island. However, before he was in office for three months, he returned to Japan proper.

Before and after the time Captain MIKI took his office, the Army forces were being repeatedly replaced, and although I do not remember in detail the staff officers and the unit designations, I believe that the Army strength was generally and gradually decreased. I think this was only natural, as far as the Army's duties were concerned. I do not know whether or not the details of the Island's defense plan were changed while Captain MIKI was in office.

(1) Important Problems (No. 2)

In the meantime, the POWs did not readily recover from their asthenic condition which was attributed to diphtheria, chronic inflammation of the intestines, and other diseases from which they were suffering from even before their arrival to the Island, as mentioned in the foregoing. The number of deaths gradually increased. We, especially the medical officer and other persons concerned, did as much as possible, but the enemy's air raids became more and more intense as the days passed, and the casualties continued to increase. Patients suffering from exhaustion due to air raids carried out day and night, and other causes, continued to appear from all the units. At that time, as far as the Navy was concerned, our unit was the only one which had a medical officer, and all the other companies had only non-rated medical men. Being as such, the medical treatment of all the navy officers and men was charged to the medical officer and the medical ensign of our unit. At one time, even in our unit, about half of the men were ill in bed, and the situation was such that actually the medical staff were so busy as to have no time to spare. Later, I remember that it became absolutely impossible to deal with the situation so that we had a medical Lieutenant (J.G.) from the First Base Headquarters at Buin, and subsequently another medical Lieutenant (J.G.) from Lt. Kimbara's main unit come to our aid, as a result of which we finally succeeded in tiding over the crisis.

The names, dates of death, nature of diseases of the dead prisoners should be listed in my unit's Administrative Bulletin's File, so a glance will reveal them. I, the Chief of the unit that was in charge of medical treatment, feel extremely sorry that there were so many illnesses and deaths. However, on the other hand, at the time, the enemy's attacks became more

severe each day, without a single day's respite from the air raids. The POWs were in a weakened condition even before their arrival at the Island, and medical treatment could not be given them as I wished. Materials and supply situation became more difficult each day on our front line islands, and hands became short. It can also be thought that in view of the prevailing situation the result was truly unavoidable. The construction of the airfield did not progress as anticipated. Although the days passed by being hotly pressed /T.N. to speed up construction work/ and under mental agony and uneasiness, no orders or instructions from anywhere ever came to me until the end in regard to the handling of the POWs. What I feel most at the present time is that, if the POWs were employed for some appropriate work in the rear zone in a quiet and wide area far from Rabaul, it might have been another matter, but, I believe that it might be considered as unreasonable to use the POWs and limited working power by amassing them into concentrated units on a front line island where such ceaseless combat was carried out repeatedly.

Now, regarding the disposition of the corpses, there were opinions that if that small island where many people were massed and engaged in hard work became surrounded by grave-posts, it would influence everyone's morale to a great extent. Therefore, at first practically all of them were buried at sea, but due to the heat of the tropics, decomposition was rapid, so that there were opinions that this was intolerable as well as pitiful for both the dead and the burial parties. However, cremation was given up not so much because of fuel, but from the standpoint of air defense in connection with the rising of smoke. Consequently they were buried in the ground after that.

(j) Important Problems (No. 3)

It might have been around the middle of March, 1943, that there was a sudden air raid at night. Many bombs were dropped in the Army area, the POW area, and the Takahashi Company area, where there was practically no damage until then. There were three direct hits by large type bombs in the area where the POWs resided, resulting in 280 (this figure is not accurate. Should be recorded in the Battalion's Administrative Bulletin's File) some odd prisoners being blasted or burnt to death. The reason why there were so many casualties was because this spot was away from the approach course to the airfield and had not been bombed before, so it is said that most of the men, feeling confident, did not take any action to shelter themselves from the air raid.

I believe that it might have been at this time that Lt. Takahashi, the Naval Company Commander, too, was killed in action.

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an urgent dispatch order from the headquarters at Buin to the following effect: "Several enemy cruisers and destroyers are cruising off Mono Island, and as a landing is most probable, all the units are to immediately prepare to check the enemy landing." By this time, the actual number of POWs had already dropped considerably to some 90 odd men (less than 100 at any rate). Excepting those connected with the kitchen, I believe most of the men had lost a great deal of their vigour. From the standpoint of the condition of troop equipment at the time, and also from the topography of the island, in the face of a powerful enemy assault, there were only two alternatives, total victory or total annihilation. In fact I believe that the latter seemed to be anticipated more strongly. I do not think that it was an unreasonable reasoning for all the men to resign themselves to death after eliminating "the fear of the tiger at the rear door" /T.N. refers to the POWs/. From such thought, the above-mentioned POWs were all bayoneted to death by an Army company charged with the duty in accordance with the previously established defense plan. (I do not know the unit designation. It is said that hand grenades were not used). All the units made preparations, feverishly working on defense measures against the enemy's surprise assault landing, and waited throughout the night, but the enemy did not attack this island after all.

Actually, I believe that the difficult and unfavorable turn of the battle situation strained our nerves to an extreme, and excited us too much /T.N. resulting in the killing of the POWs/. It can only be said that the Company merely followed the rules of the plan of defense mechanically, but I consider that same was also unavoidable in some respects, especially when placed face to face with such a tense situation.

(1) Important Problems (No. 5)

This matter concerns a certain First Lieutenant (both status and name unknown) who was shot to death on the very day of the landing. I believe a record of this case is set forth at the beginning of the report concerning POWs who were under the charge of my Battalion.

It was when the POW party was landed on this island, as a result of the negotiations which are mentioned in another section, with the Army officer who was in charge of them, it was arranged that the POWs should remain temporarily on this island. When I believed the said commander had returned to his transport vessel, he again appeared before me with a POW who was under arrest and being dragged along by soldiers, and said: "On returning to the ship, I found this POW had been arrested as he had tried secretly to escape by jumping into the water and swimming towards Shortland Island. So the number of POWs I reported to you before was less one. Will you receive him together with the others?" As for me, I did not know what to do. And, moreover, what I could do with such a man as he, who had dared ~~try~~ to escape even in such an environment, especially here, on this solitary island surrounded by water on all sides? Therefore I gave him a

firm refusal. He pressed me to accept him, saying, as before, that he had to attend to other duties at once and begged me to manage in some way or other. Then I questioned him as to what measure would be taken by the Army. He answered that in case of escape in the face of the enemy this would naturally be punished by death. As the matter had to be settled at once and, also, from the standpoint of our naval discipline, I simply believed that escape in the face of the enemy in wartime should as a matter of course call for capital punishment. I thought, also, that it could not be avoided from the viewpoint of making it an example for the strict enforcement of military discipline on this island in the future. Without any further consideration it was decided to execute him in the presence of both of us. And, finally, the Army guards shot him to death with their rifles on the beach near the secluded jungle on the eastern coast of the Island. (Presumably, these soldiers belonged under the aforesaid Army officer and were not the 15 guards attached to the POW unit). At first, I intended to behead him with my Japanese sword. But, at the last moment, I became timid and therefore could not do so. Since this happened, I have pondered over the case and have always felt the pangs of conscience. Not only have I been cautioning myself ever since against repeating such an action in the future, in whatever circumstances, but I also strictly warned my men not to act cruelly in speech or action towards the POWs. I feel my responsibility very acutely, especially in the case of this certain First Lieutenant.

III. Supplementary Remarks

I have found in the newspaper of the morning of 19th January 1946 that my arrest has been ordered as a war crime suspect. As I had been anyhow the central figure of the building work of the airfield on Ballale Island where had occurred the deaths of more than 500 POWs, I had already presumed that I would be the first to be so designated. But taking into consideration that, firstly, the time was extremely early, and secondly, that only I, who had no substantial power of command but only a superficial one, and who had been only a commander of construction work as it were, was so designated and no names of those with whom I had been acquainted were mentioned, I supposed that the investigation on the spot might have been surprisingly incomplete; consequently I was worried that, if I should make my appearance at once, I should be obliged to bring forward the names of too many other persons or would have to state matters which are unnecessary to mention in order to clarify all the facts in detail for the sake of impartial judgment; unless I were resolved to lay down my life, shouldering all the responsibilities by myself, letting everything to be left unsaid (although I have lost such a frame of mind now as I have been informed of the truths of various disclosed facts during nearly one year after the cessation of hostilities). Furthermore, I felt very pained at the idea of being placed under arrest which I had been taught traditionally as being a disgrace and I imprudently tried to escape this as long as possible as the result of various illusions. In the course of time, however,

I became convinced that I would not be able to conceal myself forever and also came to believe that the true facts concerning this matter might have been already investigated in detail and disclosed, then those which I would be obliged to state might probably have been already investigated in full detail and known, consequently the worry which I had as above-mentioned has ceased to exist as being uncalled for and no longer necessary. On or about the 25th of July, through the aid of the advice from a friend of mine, I learned that my flight had given much trouble to my relations, acquaintances and friends; furthermore he told me that such conduct had become an obstacle to Japan's faithful fulfillment of her obligations in connection with her acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, implying that I was showing direct disloyalty to the state. When I came to think it over I became really shocked.

Ever since I decided to escape I had been thinking that it would be simple enough to kill myself if the worst should come, which amounted to nothing if I considered that I had died in the Solomons, and I should be able to shoulder all responsibilities by committing suicide. Although I made light of such matter, still I found that it could not be carried out so easily when the critical moment arrived. Since the latter part of July, I gave this matter thorough consideration, arranged all my personal matters in order, and after bidding farewell to my close relatives whom I asked to look after my family, on July 30 I gave myself up to a member of the Hoshimoto Police Station, Wakayama Prefecture, and I have remained here ever since. I realize that my responsibility is heavy for having evaded justice for nearly six months.

Now I should like to be subjected to impartial judgment, by stating all the facts most frankly and exposing everything to light. Individual subjects which I have written in this document may be identified and clarified still further by comparing same with the records of that time.

(The End)

This confession of mine represents, in its entirety, a frank description of actual facts, and contains no false statements.

The writer of the above:

Norihiko Ozaki

/fingerprint/

August 8, 1946.

No. 1

「バリス島」航行英艦大捕虜に關し陳述

元「バリス島」駐在海軍第八設営隊長

尾崎 惠 彦

ATIS

お多忙惠顧中、過二日、「バリス島」過去を單に記憶文に
賴て記述します。月日と時刻とが数字に就ては明確
ではあらず、多分入手に居る海軍又陸軍の當時の周知
記録を参照すれば明白と云ひます。此より即諒解を願
います。

〔一〕 經過概要

(1) 我部隊は二面に亘る「カタカラン」島へ進出が失敗を終つて
ら當時待機中居た「ボウダインドル」島の「アイ」から問題点を
島に至る飛行場を設営せよと命令を受け直ちに（西
十七年十月二十七日頃）「バリス島」に進出する。

(2) 當時同島は無人島であり、小島は海軍が豫め
「アイ」飛行場補強の意味に飛行場設営を調査し、調査
は一応完了した。

我部隊は下等兵、尉官を除く外には設営関係者員八名
で、作業力に概三員弱である。

當時当隊の所属七班に第二班を飛行機隊から命令され

第一班を敵隊司令官の指揮下に置くことになり、四班を

尾崎 惠 彦

第一應完成せる作業員は約四十名あり、増援するに乏しい意味
の事であり、

然るに四十名、増援隊は待てざるなりと、刻々目しよせぬ。只一時、
ツラノ島第四建設部の派遣二員、加ふる者あり、是れは二日位、
「ムンダ」に轉進せしめられ、つゝ凡そ此の隊員も過半数が病人であつた
勞働力の期待は出来ぬものありよし。

そこで當隊としては「アウゲイビル」島に在る陸軍兵力を作業に使用
援を懇請すること、及び附近の島々「アウゲイビル」「シロトウ」
等、主計長、軍医、大尉その他所屬の隊員を附けて各地を宣撫の上島の
之を宣傳し、その勞働力を利用する、と取りかかりし。

(1) 同島へ進出せし後、数日後と思ふが或日夕方突如として、入
りたる輸送船が投錨して捕虜らしき者數百名が本島に上陸した
との事だ。その中に陸軍大尉(記憶す)の指揮官が私(ア)ら
にやゝ来て「アウゲイビル」島を陸軍の捕虜五百名を連れて来た
ことは貴地飛行場設備作業に使役せられたといふ意味
のこと申述べます。當時貴方には海軍の最高司令部より第三
六航空隊隊長の私を指揮する系統の上司から何等の聲援もな
し、指示も命令も来さぬで、一應拒絶し、

と云ふが、陸軍の將校は「アウゲイビル」島は揚陸地と見做して
之の行動に移らねばならぬ、命令せよと云ふ。自分が改任次第
貴方に對して上司を通つてこの勅令をつける。在島中の捕虜
監督官を取締る全部陸軍がやる。と言ふ意味で、
小島に十五名、陸軍教育團兵は任務終了、迄今期同捕虜

第一一底完成せし作業の量は約四千の一に増援するに止る小意味
のまゝでありまゝと

然るに四ヶ名。増援隊は待てと首をうせど。到着しよせぬ。只一時にア
ツク。島第四建設部の派遣。一人か来る所。一丁だが。これは二丁位で。勇心
「△△△」と轉進せしめりや。また一見も。水師官も。通年。数が。病人で。大した
労働力の期待は出来ぬものなほありよした。

せよ。てち隊は「アラゲイビル」島に在り陸軍兵力を作業に便し
 援を懇請する事と及び附近の島々「アラゲイビル」「シロトランド」「ラアロ
 号」主計長軍医大尉その他所要の隊員を附けて各地を宣撫せし島
 の土人を産養してその勞働力を利用する事と取りかかるとした。

(1) 同島へ進出してから数日後と思ひますが或日夕方突然可なり入
り、この輸送船は投鋪し捕虜らよき数百名が本島に上陸した
との事だ。その中に陸軍大尉(記憶不詳)指揮官が私とあ
ひあつて「バベルから命令で陸軍の捕虜は百利七名を連れて来た
のは貴地飛行場設営作業に使役されてゐる」といふ意味
の事と申述べます。で当時我方には海軍の最方司令部より第三
六航空戦隊要りの私を指揮する系統の上司からは何等の豫めもな
く指示も命令も来さぬであつて一々拒絶しつゝいた。

此の行動に移らねばなりぬ。命令は此の如く。自今が責任次第
 貴方に對しては上司を通じての竹筋道をつける。在島中の捕虜
 監督指導取締を全部陸軍がやる。その意味で新選組
 小隊長十五名、陸軍教官備兵は任力盡した。這へる期間、捕虜

陸軍駐留せしめ、貴方に於ては作業力不足、所構捕虜
の作業力を利用するのみでよい、と申すいかに、と申す事であり、四隊
と之と適当な作業に利用する事、尚ほ詰問であるが、何方より
何事、連絡し、事改、面倒を貴方、役員、保、と、私として、困る。
只彼等、所、は給、養、る、介、は、及、限、り、負、担、する、自、信、が、あ、る、や、あ、
他、は、一、切、生、ま、ぬ、と、申、す、に、こ、ろ、に、い、か、然、り、と、申、す、に、宜、い、
と、言、ふ、懲、罰、を、経、て、私、と、は、海、軍、側、の、道、義、に、た、り、何、の、
損、が、あ、る、と、申、す、一、休、養、を、受、け、く、と、申、す、一、切、と、申、す、

(三) 後、結局、最後、まで、私、方、は、何、程、の、損、も、余、り、金、も、来、る、と、申、す、

(二) 此、時、に、は、既、に、本、島、に、は、私、方、の、外、に、三、宅、海、軍、大、尉、の、指、揮、
する、十三、種、高、角、砲、中、隊、一、つ、中、隊、班、を、一、つ、居、る、と、申、す、此、外、に、は、近、
く、金、原、海、軍、大、尉、の、指、揮、する、十三、種、高、角、砲、中、隊、高、橋、由、
軍、中、尉、の、指、揮、する、八、種、高、角、砲、中、隊、各、一、個、中、隊、及、十三、種、機、銃、
所、定、小、隊、^(三、個、隊、也、)本、島、に、是、を、警、備、し、任、に、あ、る、と、申、す、金、
と、の、ま、た、は、前、記、三、宅、中、隊、の、外、に、は、未、だ、此、時、は、進、出、し、
ぬ、と、申、す、と、申、す、

更に、此、外、に、山、下、大、尉、の、島、。子、々、と、に、内、地、に、兵、を、到、着、
し、待、援、中、と、い、ふ、陸、軍、部、隊、の、諒、解、を、兵、力、約、二、大、隊、
本、島、に、来、り、ま、す、と、私、方、の、飛、行、場、設、置、の、作、業、を、進、展、し、ま、す、
と、申、す、と、申、す、と、申、す、

(一) 亦、右、如、く、求、能、て、三、宅、高、角、砲、捕、虜、を、定、然、押、付、く、と、申、す、
是、が、所、柄、相、当、量、の、勞、働、力、を、供、與、し、て、居、る、と、申、す、と、申、す、
と、い、何、等、の、私、に、と、は、斯、う、と、い、ふ、餘、り、と、申、す、と、申、す、

8月26日

数經年、金原中隊と同僚中隊も本島に進駐し、本島に私兵軍
令奉行令規定により、この従ひ當然、海軍として金原海軍大
尉の指揮を受けることになり、これが捕虜の所遇の点には別々
変更なく、前記の通り、犯行された。

(卜) 捕虜來島當時狀況

(二) 輔之飛舟上陸を以て捕獲する状況を見よと中には仲之元
を看みたりとが大部に分り難い解が甚しく独りて実行出来ず
戦友に援助せよと漸くおつと云ふ音が相重なりありと
此状況を見て飛行場を急ぎ建設所に果して幾何の奇異を期
待せしむるがと云ふと一休を不承なりと得てん

(三) 捕房の中には軍医大尉以下軍医衛室部員十名位を、
 捕房の警備軍医長は衛室部員と協同して役務、健康調査と
 やすむ。結果は「チ」とあり、患者は慢性腸炎にも多発患
 者と思ふ多し(負傷者先)との事であり、

(名譽)軍運長任應自前より一、二事向に研究。博識論文提出は、終
 極まで非名を以興味・努力を傾けたまふ後日に云々云々(一)
 十一、侵襲是に終意(一)たる飛躍を要する也)

送藥來如治癰疽。日食。都度(一週二回?)捕虜部隊
送官。請求從公一拾手走し。日常。診新記。瘡亦甚。人手不足。
除之。捕虜部隊。独立實施。またまた。急を要す。場合には
隨時。為方。應援。之に當る。是方。痛く。あり。

往之、市廳各田、病受休養者、認定、全部捕鳥部隊
市長、裁量、適意、決定、之、事、に

然し生れ境の毒化とか衰弱増進又は例生水と言ふ點
による下痢、尙是等之病也。者に因るもの多し。
日に三回食ふことなし記す。

John W. Majors
8 Aug 1861

(1271)

(五)

[illegible]

William
3 May 46

二、第六軍に補給部を設けるは、陸軍部隊に於ては、軍部の他
 所轄の者に於ては、各部隊別に非ずして一時司令部に設け
 る。此は各軍使の命令に於て會計經理官を以て之を司る。

No. 8

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（十）重要問題（五）

捕虜米島後数日を経て右を依頼中である。陸軍部隊の
平大隊が「ブグゲインビル」島に「エ」より進駐を来言不
當時の指揮は仙田陸軍大尉である。
陸軍進駐の目的は、附随的にはあるが、好まぬが、無
慢然と長蛇を尾角を誘致する。海軍飛行場作業と手傳之
り。この同一の給養を海軍が受け、本隊員は受け、終つたと思
なつたと思ふ。
設備作業の實際問題に就き、私と仙田大尉とが集
協議、この事を父へ云へる。陸軍と海軍とが、この作

[illegible]

尚死体は如直でありまゝか、あゝ狭い島にお水着。多人敷け料
 居して激しい作業に追はれ、水着の場合、前門は地が墓標に取巻、
 水着三着は互に土質に影射、着まゝと、あゝ多大であらうと云ふ一般
 意見で始め、頃々は全部水着にして居り、また此處の風景、
 の廣大、早く死者にとても水着、有事者にとても耐へ難い、
 だとなか意見も出て、大花布にすると、ほ然料より、煙の荒巻、
 だとなか意見も出て、大花布にすると、ほ然料より、煙の荒巻、
 だとなか意見も出て、大花布にすると、ほ然料より、煙の荒巻、

(三) 問題 (20分)

昭和十一年三月中旬頃かと思ひます。或る日夜間、突然、上空龍火が
あり而して三枚まで砲を投擲したのは陸軍地対空擲弾隊、高橋中
隊地には多くの爆弾が投下された。その中、擲弾隊高橋地には三
発の大爆弾が直撃があり三枚の二面、数名が正確に命中し隊内
員重に死傷した。この擲弾隊が爆弾死を遂げた。大負
の非常な多かつたのは、従来此地は飛行場への進入コースと雖も、
常に三枚まで投擲されたことがなかつた。その被害、大部命のものを母心で
避ける行動をとるに思ひからりてあると云ふ事でありました。
海軍の中隊長高橋中尉。戦死も此の時に行なつたかと思ひます。

(五) 重要問題 (五回)

昭和六年三月下旬が四月初めが開戦の記憶。主眼は(空)の空襲に
なるといふ。自衛隊に敵の空軍艦艇は又海軍中隊あり。
上陸の準備は、大に準備あり。各隊は三三三の敵に二陸阻む。準備
などいふが意味不明。敵の空軍艦艇は、命令命令が、丁度、司令部が、

手一決、此當時捕虜の現存員数は最早五十数名(何れも自決
 した)と激減し、且、其捕虜員を陳も多し、音は相當に元氣が衰へ
 ぬと思ひます。當時、本島の兵力は、水陸共に島の地勢
 がやうして有つた敵、強龍心に會つては全勝の全滅の二途がな
 かり、使者であつた、感が深かつたと思ひます。そこで使者間の
 交渉を断つて全員決死の陣を整へるといふのは無理の極み、理
 るべき事へもなかつた、どうも考へがた、捕虜には、さういふ
 ことを防衛計画、定め、従ひ、陸軍部隊の、捕虜中隊、隊を
 する、の事によつて全員銃剣刺殺、手榴弾は使用せられず、し
 ばれ、と、せ、各隊は敵の、手榴弾、上陸に備へて、さういふ防備
 措置に、従ひ、徹夜待機、したが、敵は、本島には、未
 だ、進、ま、な、か、つ、た。

之れ、結局、戦局、不利化、苛烈化に、伴ひ、吾方、人、心、も、極、度、に、緊
 張し、興奮、を、覚、え、て、の、結果、であり、防衛、計画、規定、を、機械、的
 に、断、行、した、と、い、ふ、外、は、あり、ま、な、い、断、行、した、緊張、の、場面、を、直、前
 に、或、は、又、止、む、と、得、な、かつ、た、点、も、あ、つ、た、と、い、ふ、風、も、あ、り、ま、す。

(木)重要問題(その五)

本隊の捕虜関係通達、最初、に、記、録、さ、れ、て、居、る、と、思、ひ、ま
 す、が、上、陸、当、日、銃、殺、さ、れ、た、其、中、に、(身、分、も、前、述、の、如、き、
 不、明、の、件、が、あ、り、ま、す。
 本、件、は、捕、虜、部、隊、が、本、島、に、上、陸、当、時、引、率、し、た、指、揮、
 官、陸、軍、將、校、と、別、項、に、記、す、様、子、應、酬、の、役、に、あ、つ、た、
 島、の、一、時、捕、虜、を、預、め、た、事、が、敵、の、輸、送、船、に、改、送、さ
 れ、思、は、れ、る、頃、陸、軍、兵、に、捕、縛、さ、れ、た、捕、虜、を、死、せ、
 前、記、の、指、揮、官、の、面、に、秘、し、に、あ、つ、た、事、が、一、面、は、あ、つ、た、
 船、に、改、送、さ、れ、た、此、の、捕、虜、が、本、島、に、上、陸、し、た、時、
 に、逃、走、し、た、金、子、を、身、に、あ、つ、た、事、が、後、に、あ、つ、た、事、が、

No. 14

第一、中心人物は、且、同様に於て互に辭を、捕らるる事
事實がある。故に先づ第一に指名をせられて、その事實は、後
後現へて来る。第一、言はるる諸事、其の多くは、その外
見は、見る所、實質的には、彼が指揮権を握る。故に、は、只、云々、
指揮者、が、なつて、其の、その、指揮、それ、他に見、見る、人、が、
、と、出、て、見、て、云々、其、外、現、地、調査、不、徹底、を、言、
、と、想、像、を、示、す、今、直、に、私、出、て、は、切、實、任、重、自、身、人、
、一、引、受、け、て、決、然、と、覺、悟、を、示、す、先、軍、(敗戦後、新、軍、
、向、き、る、暴、動、的、な、事、象、を、内、容、を、知、り、た、今、言、及、指、示、を、
、な、つ、て、公、正、な、裁、判、を、受、け、る、た、一、切、の、実、情、を、明、明、に、
、明、言、し、る、た、め、に、は、餘、計、を、人、事、の、前、に、引、合、ふ、に、出、て、は、
、言、は、な、か、た、た、と、或、は、申、述、へ、た、は、な、か、た、た、と、な、か、た、
、云、は、な、か、た、と、先、に、言、ふ、傳、説、と、し、て、見、て、來、る、能、い、
、解、と、な、つ、た、が、實、に、甚、南、に、傾、き、な、つ、て、先、に、言、ふ、迷、ひ、
、誤、り、を、考、へ、先、に、言、ふ、逃、避、を、考、へ、た、逃、避、を、考、へ、
、考、へ、た、月、日、の、経、過、に、伴、い、何、時、を、先、に、得、る、を、見、
、迄、に、考、へ、な、つ、た、中、に、本、件、内、容、事、象、を、同、意、最、後、編、纂、に、
、調査、を、明、明、に、な、さ、な、か、た、た、は、言、ふ、に、
、介、入、を、承、け、た、調査、を、承、け、た、言、は、な、か、た、
、私、書、院、に、最、後、不、要、の、取、越、を、考、へ、た、解、消、を、考、
、相、違、ひ、を、考、へ、た、
、(史、書、に、私、逃、避、を、親、接、知、り、及、人、達、に、至、り、
、大、に、逃、避、を、考、へ、た、
、史、書、に、私、逃、避、を、考、へ、た、

Shun-ichi
May 1946

EX 1879

Doc 5425 (cont)

全十五頁ヨリ成ル云森村君ノ谷真ハ其東京島刑
場行ニテ尾崎憲彦ノ OSAKI TOSHIHIKO ノガ余
ノ面前ニ於テ右様ヲモツテ骨ノ端印ヲノ捺シタ
ルモノニシテ一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ八月云
八日余ノ面前ニ於テソノ内容ノ真實ナルコトヲ宣
誓セリ。

東京裁判所軍事犯罪部員之官

H. S. WILLIAMS

少佐 エイチ・エス・ウィリアムスノ署名ノ

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